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3 November 1966

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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Korea: A North Korean armed penetration south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on 2 November was apparently in retaliation for a South Korean (ROK) raid into the North Korean portion of the zone on 26 October.

The North Koreans, dressed in army uniforms, attacked an eight-man US 2nd Infantry Division patrol with hand grenades and automatic weapons about 300 meters south of the DMZ southern boundary. One South Korean and six US soldiers were killed and one American was wounded. No enemy casualties have been confirmed although there is evidence that wounded or dead were dragged away. The quantity of expended ammunition in the area indicates that an intensive fire-fight took place.

The number of UN command personnel killed in armed attacks in the DMZ area since 15 October now totals 29. All the fatalities in earlier incidents were ROK personnel.

It is not known whether the ROK incursion on 26 October extended beyond the northern boundary of the DMZ. South Korean military officials may have hoped the raid would boost morale lowered by losses from North Korean attacks.

Although the North Koreans have clearly engaged in a general harassing operation along the DMZ, the targeting of the 2 November raid on American troops suggests that Pyongyang is seeking to force the US to prevent further ROK forays. The UN commander has made it clear that he will not tolerate further breaches of the armistice agreement by the ROKs.

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\*Ghana-Guinea: African delegates are optimistic that the Ghana-Guinea dispute will be ironed out in time for the OAU summit to begin on 5 November as scheduled.

The most important mediation effort, that of the three-nation OAU mission, has secured the Ghana Government's agreement that "present difficulties would be resolved" by the return of any Ghanaians now in Guinea who declare to the mission their desire for repatriation. Guinea has already agreed to permit the mission to interview the Ghanaian exiles, but its confidence that they do not wish to leave contrasts sharply with General Ankrah's belief that "all" want to come back and suggests that this solution may not prove feasible.

Meanwhile, Guinean political leaders yesterday worked out what they apparently feel is a face-saving rationalization of their charges that the US bears the responsibility for their delegation's detention.

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NOTES

USSR: The Soviets have again shown willingness to join in discussions with the US in areas not touching upon the Vietnam war. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Soviet scientists said they were willing to hold technical talks with the US and Britain on the detection of underground nuclear tests. Previously, Moscow had insisted that no technical discussions were necessary, claiming that all such tests are detectable. [REDACTED]

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Denmark: Prime Minister Krag has called special elections for 22 November as a result of his failure to obtain parliamentary backing yesterday for his minority Social Democratic government's tax reform proposals. Krag's resignation reflects the determination of his party to stick to its own program rather than make concessions on an issue which Krag believes has strong electoral appeal. The election campaign is likely to be fought primarily on domestic issues, since there is wide agreement among virtually all non-Communist parties on Danish foreign and defense policies. [REDACTED]

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